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498 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE PROTECTION OF
RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS II
HARRY P. WARNER
PHONOGRAPH RECORDS AND THE RIGHTS OF PERFORMING ARTISTS
In 1934 the late Maurice J. Speiser published a translation of
a French text on the legal rights of performing artists.120 An
Addendum to this translation "speculated" upon the theories
which could be employed by the courts to establish a property
right in a performer's recorded performance.121
1. The Copyright Code. The first theory discussed was whether
the Copyright Act could be invoked to protect the legal rights
of performing artists. Speiser contended that an artist's inter-
pretation was an "original" creation which had been reduced
to a "writing" when recorded upon a film, phonograph record
or piano roll. 122 A "writing" should not be restricted to a tangible
visual expression 12 3 but should extend to "something recorded
which is capable of appreciation or comprehension by any of the
senses, particularly that of hearing."124 Speiser concluded that
the courts would not adopt this theory since Congress in enact-
ing the Copyright Act of 1909 did not extend the protection of
the statute to phonograph records nor to the performances re-
corded theron.25
120. HOMBURG, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERFORMING ARTISTS (1934).
121. HOMiBURG, op. cit. supra note 120, at 141 ff.
122. COPYRIGHT CODE, 61 STAT. 652 (1947); 17 U.S.C. § 4 (Supp. 1950).
"The works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall in-
clude all the writings of an author."
123.. Cf. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
124. HOMBURG, op. cit. supra note 120, at 145.
125. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Alt. 631,
633-4 (1937) note 2: "Prior to 1909 mechanical devices, such as music rolls,
discs and records, for the reproduction of sound, were held to be beyond
the scope of the copyright laws and not to infringe protected works which
they were the means of audibly reproducing. Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C.
562; White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 28 S. Ct.
319, 52 L. Ed. 655, 14 Ann. Cas. 628. By the statute of that year, however,
the composer or copyright proprietor was given control, in accordance
with the provisions of the act of the manufacture and use of such devices,
although the right of copyright was not extended to the mechanical repro-
ductions themselves. (See the report of the Patent Committee to the House
of Representatives which accompanied the presentation of the act and pur-
ported to explain its scope (H. Rep. No. 2222 which accompanied H. R.
28192, 60th Cong., 2nd Sess. [1909]). By the provisions of the act, if the
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2. Common Law Copyright.12 6 A performer's interpretation of
a musical or literary composition was considered an original
intellectual production hence he had a common law property
right therein which permitted him to control and limit its use.2 T
The difficulty with this theory and one which Speiser was fully
cognizant of, was that common law copyright would be lost by
publication. This theory held scant promise.2
3. The Right of Privacy. This new tort was and is an ex-
pansive concept which has enlarged and added to the founda-
tions theoretically developed and outlined by Messrs. Warren
and Brandeis. 12 9 The privacy doctrine prohibits not only the un-
authorized use of a person's name or physical likeness for adver-
tising or trade purposes, but has been extended to prevent the
unauthorized use of a person's name on a petition or in connec-
tion with a political or governmental matter, 30 wiretapping or
other forms of eavesdropping, 13' the posting of a debtor by a
creditor,32 etc. Today, the right of privacy is concerned pri-
marily with the protection of mental interests. It is restricted
to matters peculiarly personal, private and seclusive as distin-
owner of the musical copyright uses or permits the use of records for
mechanical reproduction of the work, any other persion may make similar
records upon the payment to the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents
on each record, although this does not permit their use for public perform-
ances for profit. See Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir.
1929). The measure of protection thus given in the case of pianola records
and phonograph discs is to the composer, and not the performer. Plaintiff,
in 1935, made application to the Register for a copyright on the 'personal
interpretation by Fred Waring' of the musical composition 'Lullaby of
Broadway.' The application was not rejected, the Register of Copyrights
saying, inter alia: 'There is not and never has been any provision in the
Act for the protection of an artist's personal interpretation or rendition
of a musical work not expressible by musical notation in the form of
"legible" copies although the subject has been extensively discussed both here
and abroad.'"
126. This subject is discussed in Warner, Protection of the Content of
Radio and Television Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REv.
209 (1950).
127. Savage v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908): "... The
manner, method and art of every performer is individual and his own
property." Cf. Murray v. Rose et al, 30 N.Y.S.2d. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
128. Warner, supra note 126, at 209.
129. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. R)v. 193
(1890); see PROssER, TORTS, c. 21 (1941); Feinberg, Recent Developments
in the Law of Privacy, 48 Coi. L. Rnv. 713 (1948).
130. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
131. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2
S.E.2d 810 (1939) ; Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
132. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Trammel v.
Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
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guished from such wrongs as libel, slander, trespass or injury
to property, assault, etc., for which there are other legal reme-
dies.138 Speiser referred to this doctrine as "new in our juris-
prudence and not yet crystallized (which) may some day offer
to the performer his desired protection. Its basis is the right
to be free from unwanted publicity. However, it is extremely
doubtful whether today it is of any aid to the performer." 1"4
4. Unfair Competition. Speiser was of the opinion that the
misappropriation theory of the Associated Press case could be
extended to cover a radio station's unauthorized use of a musi-
cian's recorded performance, since the station in selling its
recorded programs to advertisers was competing with the musi-
cian who sought-to sell the advertiser a live program. To quote
Speiser's concept of the law of unfair competition: "Therefore,
if the doctrine of unfair competition is based upon fair play and
if we concede that it is not fair play to utilize the talents and
fame of a performer without compensation, then since the per-
former has a property right in his rendition under the rule laid
down in International News Service v. Associated Press, he
should be accorded equitable protection upon the basis of 'the
unfair taking of (his) property.' 23135
5. The Doctrine of Moral Rigkt. The real basis for the recog-
nition of performing rights was the doctrine of moral right, or
le droit moral, derived from continental jurisprudence.13' Speiser
did not expressly advocate this theory, but his Addendum sug-
gested that the doctrine of moral right could be applied if not
under its own colors, then under the guise of common law copy-
right, unfair competition, libel, right of privacy or equitable
relief.
The doctrine of moral right warrants examination and dis-
cussion since it is the corner-stone for the rights now asserted
by performing artists. This doctrine furnishes protection to the
133. WARNER, RADIO AND TaLsxsIoN LAW, § 220a (1949).
134. HOmbURG, op. cit. supra note 120, at 151.
135. Ibid.
136. The moral right doctrine is discussed by the following: Roeder, The
Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940); MICHAELIDEs-NoUAROS, THE MORAL
RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR: STUDY OF FRENCH LAW, OF COiPARATIVE LAW AND
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Am. ed. 1937); LADAs, THE INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY (1939) c. XIX-Moral Rights
of Authors: Copyright Bulletin No. 2-3,. 58 ff. (II UNESCO 1949); Note,
Moral Rights of Artists, 49 COL. L. REv. 132 (1949).
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following rights of authors or creators of intellectual property:
(a) the right to create and publish in any form desired ;137
(b) the right of reputation which recognizes that an artist
has such an interest in his work as to allow him independently
of copyright to enjoin every deformation, mutilation or other
modification thereof or any contrary assertion of paternity ;138
(c) the right of repentence which recognizes the artist's
plenary authority to determine for the purposes of correction
when his work is completed and even after he has announced
the work complete to prevent publication if a subsequent change
in his principles or style causes the work to fall beneath his
standards ;13
(d) the right to be protected against all other injuries to the
creator's personality, including the prohibition against exces-
sive criticism.240 Several English and American decisions have
indirectly applied this doctrine under the guise of unfair com-
petition," libel, 1 2 right of privacy 143 and equitable relief.144 But
those courts which have expressly passed upon this issue, have
repudiated this doctrine."45 As was stated in the Vargas case:
137. Copyright Bulletin No. 2-3 at 60: (II UNESCO 1949) "It is gen-
erally recognized that the work remains the author's secret until he consents
to divulge it. The right is recognized simply at the right 'to publish' in
most laws." The Copyright Bulletin refers to this as the "right of secrecy."
138. The UNESCO Copyright Bulletin designates this as the "right to
the integrity of the work." See MICHAELIDES-NOUAROS, op. cit. supra note
136, at 270, 280-298; Roeder, supra note 136, at 561, 565.
139. Roualt v. Vollard, Civil Court of the Seine (First Part), July 10,
1946, 16 LITURGICAL ARTs, No. 3, p. 91 (May, 1948); The UNESCO Copy-
right Bulletin designates this as the "rights to assert the authorship of the
work"; LADAS, op. cit. supra note 136, at 803.
140. Additional rights which may be asserted by an author are: (a) the
right to correct, (b) the right to retract and (c) the right to reply. See
Roeder, supra note 136, at 572 ff.
141. Cf. Fisher v. Star Company, 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921),
affirming, 188 App. Div. 964, 176 N.Y.Supp. 899 (1919), cert. denied, 257
US. 654 (1921); Landa v. Greenberg, 24 T.L.R. 441 (ch. 1908); Prouty
v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F.Supp. 265 (D.C. Mass. 1939).
142. Ben-Abel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432
(1929); D'Altomonte v. Herald Co., 154 App.Div. 453, 139 N.Y.Supp. 200(1913), affd, 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913); Locke v. Gibbons, 164
Misc. 877. 299 N.Y.Supp. 188 (1937), af'd, 253 App. Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d
1015 (1938).
143. Ellis v. Hurst, 66 Misc. 235, 121 N.Y.Supp. 438 (1910).
144. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Per-
sonality, 29 HARv. L. Rav. 640 (1916).
145. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church in City of New York, 89
N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th
Cir. 1947); Meliodon v. Phila. School District, 328 Pa. 457, 195 Atl. 905
(1938); cf. Shastakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d
575 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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"The conception of 'moral rights of authors so fully recog-
nized and developed in the civil law countries has not yet
received acceptance in the law of the United States. No
such right is referred to by legislation, court decision or
writers.'"
"What plaintiff in reality seeks is a change in the law in
this country to conform to that of certain other countries.
We need not stop to inquire whether such a change, if desir-
able, is a matter for the legislative or judicial branch of the
government; in any event, we are not disposed to make any
new law in this respect." 14 6
It is believed that if the doctrine of moral right is to be
accepted in our jurisprudence, its recognition should be effec-
tuated by legislative action rather than by judicial decision. The
difficulties which would confront a court in attempting to apply
le droit moral via the common law and without benefit of legis-
lative standards are illustrated by Shostakovich v. Twentieth-
Century Fox Film Corporation.47 Plaintiff, a world famous Rus-
sian composer had his music reproduced in defendant's motion
picture "The Iron Curtain." The music was used for incidental
background matter and was in the public domain. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin the use of his music on three theories: invasion
of his right of privacy, defamation, and moral rights. The first
two causes of action, though couched in the garb of common
law remedies sought relief under the doctrine of moral right.
The court rejected all three contentions. With reference to the
moral right theory the court stated:
"The wrong which is alleged here is the use of plaintiffs'
music in a moving picture whose theme is objectionable to
them in that it is unsympathetic to their political idealogy.
The logical development of this theory leads inexplicably
to the Doctrine of Moral Right (53 Harvard Law Review).
There is no charge of distortion of the compositions nor
any claim that they have not been faithfully reproduced.
Conceivably under the doctrine of Moral Right the court
could in a proper case, prevent the use of a composition of
work in the public domain, in such a manner as would be
violative of the author's rights. The application of the doc-
trine presents much difficulty however. With reference to
that which is in the public domain there arises a conflict
between the moral right and the well established rights of
others to use such works . . . . So, too, there arises the
146. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
147. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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question of the norm by which the use of such work is to
be tested to determine whether or not the author's moral
right as an author has been violated. Is the standard to be
good taste, artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts
or what is it to be? In the present state of our law the very
existence of the right is not clear, the relative positions of
the rights thereunder with reference to the rights of others
is not defined nor has the nature of the proper remedy been
determined. Quite obviously therefore, in the absence of
the infliction of a willful injury or of any invasion of a
moral right, this court should not consider granting the
drastic relief asked on either theory."'148
Another phase of the doctrine of moral right-the right of
reputation, which enables an author to prevent mutilization or
deformation of his work after he has assigned or licensed the
use of it for dramatization or other purposes-illustrates the
need for legislative in lieu of judicial treatment. The extent to
which an assignee or licensee may modify a work is tendered
in connection with the adaptation of stories or dramas for screen
or broadcasting purposes. The assignee or licensee must be
allowed a fairly free hand with respect to the details because of
the different methods of presentation and the public to be served.
As a general rule the extent to which changes, additions, etc.
may be made to a literary work is governed by contract between
the parties. In case of a dispute the courts will interpret the
contract.149 But the "authority to modify, whether express or
implied is never unlimited. In no case should the modification
go so far as to attribute to the creator ideas which he does not
believe and did not originally express; nor should the intrinsic
esthetic quality of the work be subject to alteration; even though
the power to modify be given, a tragedy cannot be changed to
a comedy, a philosophic essay to a farce." 50 This problem re-
ceived attentive consideration by a federal court:
"And now as to what is acquired when one procures the
right to elaborate upon an original story. Upon this much
need not be said. I take it that, while scenery, action and
characters may be added to an orignal story, and even sup-
plant subordinate portions thereof, there is an obligation
upon the elaborator to retain and give appropriate expres-
sion to the theme, thought and main action of that which
148. Ibid.
149. Cf. Dreiser v. Paramount Public Corp. (N.Y. Sup. St. 1931), emo-
randum opinion.
150. RoEDEa, supra note 136, at 571.
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was originally written. The unqualified grant of this right
is, I should say, fraught with danger to a writer of standing,
particularly when he inserts no provision for his approval of
such elaboration as may be made. Nevertheless, elaboration
of a story means something other than that the same should
be discarded; and its title and authorship applied to a
wholly dissimilar tale."151
The foregoing discussion indicates clearly that the common
law furnishes no case law of experience nor standards to guide
the courts in adjusting the interests of authors and creators who
are in obvious conflict with enterpreneurs, publishers, motion
picture producers, broadcasters, record manufacturers, etc. This
conflict can only be resolved by legislative remedies. Within the
last decade, several bills have been introduced in Congress which
recognize the doctrine of moral right.Y1 This has been vigorously
opposed by the motion picture and broadcast industries whose
interests are distinctly adverse to the existence of this doctrine. 1 "
. 151. Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, Inc., et al., 283 Fed. 219(S.D.N.Y. 1922); See also: Packard v. Fox Film Cprp., 207 App. Div. 311,
202 N.Y. Supp. 164 (1923).152. E.g., S. 3047, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) section 41 (v) : "Independ-
ently of the copyright in any work secured under this Act, as amended, and
even after the assignment thereof, the author retains the right to claim the
authorship of the work as well as the right to object to every deformation,
mutilation, or other modification of the said work which may be prejudicial
to his honor or to his reputation: Provided, however, that nothing in thisparagraph shall limit or otherwise affect the right of full freedom of
contract between the author of a work and an assignee or licensee thereof,
or invalidate any express waiver or release by the author of any such
rights or of any remedies or relief to which he might be entitled in conse-
quence of a violation thereof, and the assignee or licensee of the author's
moral right may, with the author's permission, make any change in the
work which the author himself would have had a right to make prior to
such assignment." The foregoing is derived from Art. 6 -. Bern Conven-
tion, Rome revision 1928, quoted in Roeder, 556: "(1) Independently of thepatrimonial rights'of the author, and even after the assignment of the said
rights, the author retains the right to claim the paternity of the work, as
well as the right to object to every deformation, mutilation or other modi-
fication of the said work, which may be prejudicial to his honor or to his
reputation. (2) It .is left to the national legislation of each of the countries
of the Union to establish the conditions for the exercise of these rights. The
means for safeguarding them shall be regulated by the legislation of the
country where protection is claimed."
153. Testimony of Edwin P. Kilroe at Hearings before the Committee on
Patents, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1012 (1936): "Mr. Kilroe. Our chief objec-
tion, as I said, is to the moral clause. That is of great concern to the
nmotion-picture industry; we must have a right to change an author's work.
I will only read now our objections that were heretofore imposed to the
use of the moral clause and it applies fully today as it did two years ago:
'The right to make changes in an author's work is of the utmost importance
to the motion-picture industry. A dramatic play or story is usually written
with an appeal to a particular class. A motion picture is intended to have
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The moral right concept where recognized, has been expanded
by legislation, judicial decision and collective bargaining agree-
ments to furnish protection to the interpretative rights of per-
formers.15 4 The theoretical basis for protecting the interests of
performers is premised on the notion of work done. This theory
of labor rights rejects the view that performers' rights are based
on literary and artistic property; the latter is the prerogative
of creators and authors. 155 The concept of work done considers
artists as a category of producers whose product possesses an
economic value which varies according to the conditions under
which it is utilized.
The constituent elements of performers' rights may be briefly
noted:
(a) Right of Authorization. This is an exclusive right in the
performer to authorize the recording, reproduction and broad-
casting by mechanical, radio-electric or other means of his inter-
pretations as well as the public utilization of recordings or
broadcasts of such interpretations. This term is derived from
the doctrine of moral right, viz., the right to create and publish
entertainment value for the great masses and its financial success depends
upon its mass-psychology entertainment value; the wider the appeal, the
greater its value. A limitation on the right to change the plot, theme, se-
quence, and description of the characters in literary works would bring
havoc to the film industry. An example of this danger will be found in the
recent case of the production of the motion picture Wonder Bar. Warner
Bros. purchased the motion-picture rights of Wonder Bar from a foreign
publishing house to whom the authors had previously sold these rights.
After paying a substantial sum to the publishing house, Warners paid an
additional sum to the authors for the right to change the story and inter-
polate music. After the picture had been in distribution in the United
States and ready for distribution in foreign countries, the authors made a
demand for an exorbitant additional sum of money, to wit, $100,000, under
the moral-rights clause of the Rome Convention, threatening that if they
did not receive an adjustment of the claim they would enjoin the distribu-
tion of the picture in Europe and seek money damages."' Id. at 397 ff.
testimony of Sidney M. Kaye in behalf of the National Association of
Broadcasters. See statement of Mr. Kilroe, in Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive E, 75th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1938) 19 et seq. Statement of Mr. Kaye, Id. at 29.
154. Report of the International Labour Organisation Rights of Per-
formers in Broadcasting, Television and the Mechanical Reproduction of
Sounds (Geneva 1949) hereinafter designated as ILO Report.
155. There has always been a conflict between the creative rights of an
author and the performer's interpretation of the former. Performers have
contended that their interpretation is sui generis, enlarging upon the
author's original form by giving it a perceptible form. See ILO Report at
23 ff.
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in any form, and serves as the basis for the moral and pecuniary
claims of performers. 16
(b) Moral Right. This term as applied to performers is in-
tended to enforce respect for the personal contribution made
by the artist in interpreting a work. This is effectuated by hav-
ing the performer's name mentioned on any recording of his
performance or any reproduction of such performance. In addi-
tion the performer may oppose any alteration or defective repro-
duction of his interpretation since his reputation and conse-
quently the economic value of his work would be affected there-
by.15
7
(c) Pecuniary Right. This concept is intended to establish
as a matter of law the right of the performer to receive financial
remuneration for recordings, radio and television transmissions,
motion picture exhibition, etc. The subsidiary rights compre-
hended by this concept are intended to assure the performer
that he will reap financial benefits from any use made by the
entrepreneur of the recordings or transmissions. Thus, an artist
may contract to appear before a given public audience; the
contract of employment is silent on the radio and television
rights. The doctrine of pecuniary right would entitle the per-
former to receive additional separate fees for any radio or tele-
vision broadcasts even though he may not hold the right of
authorization. 18
Continental jurisprudence recognizes the performing rights
of authorization, moral right and pecuniary rights by virtue of
legislation, judicial decision or collective bargaining agree-
ments. 59 Our Copyright Code does not furnish protection to
156. ILO Report at 80-81: "A number of laws in varying measure and
in one form or another, granted to the performer the right of authorization.
Thus the laws of Germany (1910), Czechoslovakia (1928), Mexico (1947),
United Kingdom (1925), Switzerland (1922) and Lichtenstein (1928) grant
the performer the right of authorization in respect of sound recordings. The
Austrian Law of 1936 provides for a broad right of authorization with
regard to recordings and direct broadcasts. In Hungary, the performer
possesses, under the Law of 1921 and legal decisions, the right of authoriza-
tion with regard to the multiple copying, publication and circulation of
recordings, including direct broadcasts."
157. Id. at 25-26; 81-83.
158. Id. at 27-29; 84-87.
159. E.g., Id. at 82: "In France, the collective agreement made in March
1946, between the French Broadcasting Corporation and the National
Actors' Union stipulates that the name of the artist must be announced at
the microphone in every broadcast, of whatever nature."
Washington University Open Scholarship
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performing artists.8 0 To be sure the collective bargaining agree-
ments executed by the American Federation of Radio Artists
(A.F.R.A.) and the American Federation of Musicians (A.F.
of M.) deal with performing rights.16' But collective bargaining
agreements are outside the scope of this study. Our concern is
the extent to which the common law has been and should be
employed to recognize and protect interpretative performing
artists.
To return to phonograph records, Speiser's Addendum did
not advocate the complete adoption of le droit moral with all
of its subsidiary rights. He did suggest that protection be
furnished the artist "to preserve the integrity of his art" and
to assure him a "return for any commercial utilization of his
talents, whether the transmission take place over the wires, or
by wireless or whether they consist of sounds or images or signs
(anticipating television) .,,162
Soon after the publication of Speiser's dissertation, the Na-
tional Association of Performing Artists (NAPA) was organ-
ized, with Fred Waring as president and Maurice J. Speiser as
general counsel. C3 This organization which was open to "any
actor, singer, conductor, instrumentalist, lecturer and any other
interpretive artist or performer" had as its objective the licens-
ing of performing rights in "phonograph records, discs, electri-
160. Supra Note 125.
161. ILO Report at 67-68: The A.F.R.A. live commercial code prescribes
minimum fees for actors and singers. They receive "rehearsal" fees and
additional compensation for the re-transmission of a performance. The
A.F.R.A. Transcription Code regulates the use of the various recordings,
viz., custom-built, open-end and library service transcriptions, prescribes
the remuneration of performers on the basis of length of the programme
and number and duration of rehearsals. Actor's Equity Association demands
that their members receive an additional fee if the performance is broad-
cast and televised. The A. F. of M. is asserting performing rights via
royalty payments from record manufacturers. See: Countryman, The Or-
ganized Musicians, 16 U. OF CH. L. Rav. 56, 239 (1939); Diamond and
Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and Phonograph Records, 11 AiR L.
REv. 29 (1940).
162. HOMBURG, op. cit. supra, note 120, at 152.
163. Hearings on Revision of Copyright Laws, op. cit. supra, note 153,
at 673 ff. statement of Maurice J. Speiser. In 1934 the American Society of
Recording Artists, Inc., was incorporated in California with Al Jolson as
President. See 4 NAB Reports 1495 (1936). In 1937 it merged with NAPA.
See also Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary,
H.R. Rep. No. 1269, H.R. Rep. No. 1270, H.R. Rep. No. 2570, 80th Cong. 1st
Sess. 8, 209 (1947).
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cal transcriptions, sound tracks, or any other mechanical record-
ing of sound, including television" to the users thereof.'8 '
Before discussing the litigation instituted by NAPA, it should
be pointed out that the owners of phonograph records as dis-
tinguished from the performers have successfully invoked the
doctrine of unfair competition to prevent the unauthorized use
-of phonograph records. 165
NAPA instituted its first test case in Pennsylvania. Waring's
Pennsylvanians, an incorporated orchestra, recorded two songs
for the Victor Talking Machine Company in 1932. The orchestra
received $250 for each recording. Waring, foreseeing the like-
lihood of the records being used by radio stations stipulated with
the Victor people that the records should bear the legend "Not
licensed for radio broadcasts." The records were sold on the
open market to the general public at the retail price of 75 cents
per record. Defendant broadcasting station purchased these
records and broadcast the same as part of a sustaining program.
Defendant complied with the regulations of the Federal Com-
munications Commission requiring the announcement and iden-
tification of all mechanical reproductions. 166 At the time of this
broadcast, Waring's orchestra was under an exclusive radio con-
tract to the Ford Motor Company at $13,500 per week. Plaintiff
filed a bill in equity to enjoin defendant from broadcasting the
records.
The lower court enjoined the unauthorized broadcasting of
phonograph records. This opinion relied on all of Speiser's
164. Id. at 674.
165. Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Hesslein Opera Disc Co., Inc., (D.C.
N.Y. 1923) unreported; Fonotipid Limited et al. v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909); Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 Fed. 926(C.C.W.D.N.Y. 1912). England grants a copyright in the record itself;
in addition the Act of July 31, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 46 makes it a crime
to record the performance of a dramatic or musical work without the con-
sent in writing of the performer. This statutory provision furnishes a sum-
mary criminal remedy; it cannot be invoked by a performer in a civil suit
for damages and injunction. Musical Performers Protection Ass'n. Inc. v.
British International Pictures, Ltd., 46 L.T.R. 485 (1930). Thus the law
gives the performer no property right in his performance. See also Grama-
phone Co., Ltd. v. Stephen Corwardine & Co., [1934] Ch. 450. For a brief
summary of foreign laws and decisions regarding the performing artist,
see, Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in his
Interpretive Rendition (1939) I COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOsIuM 9 48 IfT
166. The Commission's regulation, section 3.188, requiring the announce-
ment of mechanical records is quoted in its entirety in WARNR, RADIo AND
TL aVIsIoN LAw § 34 f. 1, note 11 (1949).
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theories to substantiate the issuance of the injunction.167 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. 16 8
The court relied on common law copyright and unfair compe-
tition to sustain the issuance of the injunction. A majority of
167. Opinion of Judge McDevitt in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Sta-
tion, Philadelphia C.P. January, 1936, aff'd, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937).
"Conclusions of Law:
1. The creator of a unique and personal interpretation of a musical and/or
literary composition possesses a common law property right in the same,
and has a right to control and limit its use.
2. The individuality, personality and unsual talents of such an artistic
interpreter identify his production, creation or performance in such a man-
ner as to make it different, and consequently, per se, a special value with
pecuniary worth.
3. The interpretive talent of the complainant is creative and vests in him
an incorporeal property right, just as firmly as though it were corporeal
property.
4. Such incorporeal property is entitled to protection.
5. A creation or interpretation that may be captured or transcribed by
mechanical means, and then capable of reproduction at the will of the
possessor, makes such an interpretation or creation, property.
6. The integrity of one's art is entitled to protection, and the law gives
such artist a right to command a return for any commercial utilization of
his talent.
7. The talents, creations and interpretations of a performing artist, may
only be used or exploited under the terms and conditions imposed by the
creator. Any other use is an infringement of his property right, and an
injury to his name and commercial worth.
8. The law will follow science and arts in throwing the necessary protection
about property rights, both corporeal and incorporeal, tangible and in-
tangible.
9. The making of a phonograph record or the sale of the same, under such
conditions as were imposed in the suit at issue, does not constitute a
publication.
10. The respondent's purchase of said records vested in him a possession
and ownership, subject, however, to the special property right of the com-
plainant.
11. Such a use of a phonograph record as has been made by the respondent
in this matter, is a commercial use for profit.
12. The complainant and the RCA-Victor Company were within their legal
rights in producing said records for sale and limited use.
13. The respondent's use of said records violated the express restriction
stamped thereon, and was an unlawful interference with complainant's
right. The respondent's use of said records is an interference with the
complainant's contractual relations with the international company, with
which he has a contract for his exclusive broadcasting services.
14. The limitation of use or restriction stamped upon the face of the records
was a condition or servitude inseparable from the records.
15. The restriction stamped upon the records is not an interference with
the purchaser of said records to use them for the purpose intended, it is
not an unreasonable condition, its enforcement would not be in restraint
of trade, and its enforcement does not create a monopoly. It is a protection
of the property right vested in the complainant and enforceable in equity.
16. Such use of said records, as the use made by the respondent, creates
unfair competition."
168. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtL
631 (1937).
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the court concluded that Waring's interpretation of a musical
composition constituted a product of novel and artistic creation
which invested him with a property right therein. Waring not
only added something to the composition performed but also
participated in creating a product in which the performer "is
entitled to a right of property, which in no way overlaps or
duplicates that of the author in the musical composition."
The next question tendered was whether the sale of the
records constituted a general publication, thereby resulting in
a loss of common law property rights. 69 The court had some diffi-
culty with this point. It distinguished between a "limited" pub-
lication which does not affect common law copyright and a
"general" publication which terminates it. The court then dis-
regarded the extent to which the recording had been communi-
cated to the public and concluded that the restrictive label on
the record showed an intent on Waring's part not to release
his common law copyright to the public. The question of whether
there had been a general publication then turned on the issue
of whether th restriction was reasonable. 1" 0 The court confused
the issue of reasonableness of an equitable servitude with the
question of whether there had been a "general" publication. It
dismissed "as comparatively early cases" a group of decisions
which held that once there had been a general publication, it
cannot properly be limited by restrictions and servitudes. The
court further held that the restrictive legend, was neither a
restraint of trade nor contrary to public policy, hence it was
enforcible as an equitable servitude on a chattel.
The court with another judge concurring turned to the law
of unfair competition as an additional ground upon which to
sustain the injunction. The court applied the "misappropria-
tion" or "unjust enrichment" theory of the Associated Press
case:
"It appears from the Associated Press Case that while,
generally speaking the doctrine of unfair competition rests
upon the practice of fraud or deception, the presence of such
elements is not an indispensable condition for equitable
relief, but, under certain circumstances, equity will protect
an unfair appropriation of the product of another's labor
169. See Warner, supra note 126.
170. Cf. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HAIV. I,. Rsv. 945(1928); Shuhnan, The Fair Trades Acts & the Law of Restrictive Agree-
ments Affecting Chattels, 49 YAME L. J. 607, 623 (1940).
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or talent. In the present case, while defendant did not ob-
tain the property of plaintiff in a fraudulent or surrepti-
tious manner, it did appropriate and utilize for its own
profit the musical genius and artistry of plaintiff's orchestra
in commercial competition with the orchestra itself. In line
with the theory of the Associated Press case, the 'publica-
tion' of the orchestra's renditions was a dedication of them
only to purchasers for use of the records on phonographs,
and not to competitive interests to profit therefrom at
plaintiff's expense. Indeed, in the Associated Press case
the intent against an unqualified abandonment had to be
inferred from the circumstances, whereas here it was ex-
pressed on the records themselves and defendant's use of
them was a violation of the explicit notice to that effect." 171
In a concurring opinion, Judge Maxey disagreed with his
fellow judges on their reasoning on the subject of unfair com-
petition. He concluded that the law of unfair competition could
not be applied since Waring and defendent broadcast station
were not competitors in the same business. Furthermore, Judge
Maxey would not regard defendant's conduct as actionable un-
fair competition, absent the elements of fraudulent or deceptive
conduct toward the public.172
Judge Maxey claimed that the true basis for protection of
the artist was to be found in the right of privacy. We have
discussed elsewhere that the right of privacy cannot be in-
voked by an artist to "fix the limits of the publicity Which shall
be given" to his performance. When Waring's phonograph rec-
ords were made available to the general public, he was precluded
from specifying the use which purchasers could make of them.
The right of privacy is lost when an author communicates his
production to the public.173
171. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl.
631, 640 (1937); cf. Judgment of Kammergericht (Berlin) June 7, 1928(10 U. 4658/28) reported in 1 ARcHiv. 655 (1928), and discussed in detail
in WARNEa, RADiO AND TELEVIsION LAW § 215 n. 1 (1949), wherein a broad-
casting station enjoined the production and sale of phonograph records
which described the last round of a boxing bout broadcast by the plaintiff.
The court held that the defendant's activities constituted unfair competition
and was "repugnant to the requisites of honest commercial intercourse to
appropriate to one's self, without any substantial effort and cost, the fruit
of another's labor produced with considerable effort and at great cost, and
thus to create dangerous competition for the other." See Caldwell, Piracy
of Broadcast Programs, 30 CoL. L. REv. 1087 (1930).
172. Waring v. WDAS Bradcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa.- 433, 194 At
631, 642 (1937).
173. WAxN=, RADIO AND TELEvsIoN LAW § 214 (1949).
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NAPA instituted similar suits in other jurisdictions. In New
York, the contract between the performer and the recording
company did not require the records to be stamped with a
restrictive label, hence NAPA could not enjoin their use by a
radio station. 74 A similar attempt to enjoin the use of Ray
Noble's records in a tap room in Massachusetts failed because
Noble had granted to the recording company all of his rights
in the recordings, hence he had no standing to claim any interest
in the recorded performances.'7-
However, in Waring v. Dunlea, 1 7 a federal district court en-
joined a radio station from playing electrical transcriptions
which were stamped with the legend that they were to be used on
the Ford Motor program. "Although this presented an ideal case
for the application of the common law copyright doctrine (the
transcription never having been made available to the public),
the rather jumbled opinion accompanying the injunction seems
to me based on a blend of the concepts of unfair competition and
equitable servitude.' ' 177 North Carolina followed by other states
enacted legislation which nullified the Dunlea caseY.7 8
NAPA in behalf of Paul Whiteman then instituted suit in the
federal district court in New York to enjoin the use of White-
man's records by radio station WNEW. The Radio Corporation
of America (RCA) filed an ancillary suit in which it sought
similar injunctive relief and that Whiteman had no interest in
the records. The district court found that all of Whiteman's
records were stamped with the restrictive legend not to be used
for broadcasting; that in the contracts between Whiteman and
RCA prior to 1934, the former had passed all of his rights to
the latter; that in the contracts executed on September 5, 1934,
Whiteman reserved "his common law property right in and to
174. Crumit v. MIarcus Loew Booking Agency, 162 Misc. 225, 293 N.Y.
Supp. 63 (1936). '
175. Noble v. One Sixty Commonwealth Avenue, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 671
(D.C.Mass. 1937).
176. 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939).
177. Countryman, The Organized Musicians, 16 U. oF CHr. L. REV. 239,
256 (1949).
178. 2 N. C. STAT. ANN. § 66-28 (Michie, 1943): "When any phonograph
record or electrical transcription upon which musical performances are
embodied, is sold in commerce for use in this state, all asserted common
law rights to further restrict or to collect royalties on the commercial use
made of such recorded performances by any person is hereby abrogated and
expressly repealed." S. C. CoDn § 6641 (1942); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 543.02,
543.03 (1943).
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his musical interpretations and renditions." The court held this
common law copyright inured to Whiteman and that RCA could
claim no property right in the records because of their contribu-
tion to the production. Whiteman's common-law copyright sur-
vived publication and defendant's use of the records constituted
unfair competition to both Whiteman and RCA. 179
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals per Mr. Justice Learned
Hand reversed the lower court and for all practical purposes
spelled the death knell of NAPA.'8 He assumed "for the purposes
of this case" that Whiteman had a property interest in his per-
formance, "and what is far more doubtful," that the recording
company could assert a similar copyright.' 8 ' He concluded that
Whiteman's common-law copyright was destroyed by the sale
of the records to the general public; that the restrictive legend
neither limited publication nor was it enforcible as an equitable
servitude. The court also held that the law of unfair competition
was inapplicable. The Associated Press case must be restricted
to its precise facts; "certainly it cannot be used as a cover to
prevent competitors from ever appropriating the results of the
industry, skill and expense of others. 'Property' is a historical
concept; one may bestow much labor and ingenuity which inures
only to the public benefit; 'ideas' for instance, though upon them
all civilization is built may never be 'owned.' The law does not
protect them at all, but only their expression; and how far that
protection shall go is a question of more or less; an author has
no 'natural right' even so far, and is not free to make his own
terms with the public." Finally the court disposed of the right
of privacy argument in a single sentence by characterizing it as
a "strange assertion."18 2
Prior to the court's decision in the Whiteman case both NAPA
and the recording companies advised the broadcasting industry
179. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
180. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
181. See Diamond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and Phono-
graph Records, 11 AIR L. REv. 29 (1940).
182. R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940). The
court was confronted with this problem: Pennsylvania had reached a con-
trary conclusion, which meant that the broadcasting of Whiteman's records
would constitute a tort in that state. Obviously, Station WNEW could not
route its broadcasts around Pennsylvania, hence the court concluded it
would not enjoin an otherwise lawful broadcast in order to prevent com-
mission of a tort in Pennsylvania.
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that they would have to purchase licenses to use phonograph
records. 8 3 The Whiteman case terminated these claims, although
it has been suggested that the record companies might still be
able to assert an enforcible property interest in phonograph
records which might serve as the basis of a licensing system.18 4
The Whiteman case was NAPA's last attempt to secure a court
adjudication via the common law. NAPA has invoked the aid
of Congress and has had bills introduced in Congress which
would amend the Copyright Code so as to give the performer a
statutory copyright.8 5
A reading of the Waring case discloses that the Pennsylvania
court relied on the law of unfair competition to recognize per-
forming rights. But this approach masked the true basis of its
decision-the employment of the doctrine of moral right with
183. Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in Hfu
Interpretive Rendition, I COPYRIGHT LAW SYmPosIum 9, 20 (1939).
184. Countryman, The Organized Musicians 1I, 16 U. OF CHr. L.' Rav.
239, 258 (1949): "In General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric
Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), opinion on reargument 305 U.S. 124 (1938),
rehearing denied 305 U.S. 675 (1939), the Supreme Court upheld the
licensing system of a patent pool consisting of A. T. & T., General Electric
Company and R.C.A., whereby some retailers were licensed to sell patented
amplifying tubes only for radio use and others were licensed to sell them
only for non-radio use. The court also affirmed the holding that one who
purchased amplifying tubes for use in talking pictures equipment from a
retailer known to the purchaser to be licensed to sell only for radio use
was guilty of contributory infringement. Phonograph records issued by
R.C.A., Columbia and Decca had long carried on their labels a legend
reading: 'Licensed by Mfr. under U.S. Patents (citing numbers) only for
non-commercial use on phonographs in homes. Mfr. and original purchaser
agree that this record shall not be resold nor used for any other purpose.'
Hence, the General Talking Picture case seems apt precedent in support
of the demands which the recording companies originally predicated on the
district court's decision in the Whiteman case. Nevertheless, whether from
lack of confidence in their patents, from doubts about the attitude of the
new Justices toward the General Talking Picture case, and the doctrine of
contributory infringement (Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co.,
320 U.S. 661 (1944), or from other considerations of business policy, the
recording companies made no attempt to enforce their patent notices, and
those notices have recently disappeared from Victor and Columbia labels."
See also Diamond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and Phonograph
Records, 11 Am L. REv. 29 (1940).
185. E.g., the Scott bill, H.R. 1270, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) which
granted a copyright "on recordings which embody and preserve any acoustic
work in a fixed, permanent form on a disk, film, tape record, or any and all
other substances, devices, or instrumentalities, by any means whatever,
from or by means of which it may be acoustically communicated or re-
produced." The copyright extended not only to "make or procure the
making" but also to "publish and vend such recordings of sound; and to
communicate and reproduce the same acoustically totepblic for profit."'
See also: S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. 1420, 74th Cong.,
2d Seas. (1936); H.R. 10632, 74th Cong., 2d Seas. (1936).
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its subsidiary rights. The issuance of the injunction enjoining
the broadcast of phonograph records, constitutes a pro tanto
recognition of authorization and pecuniary rights. Thus, the
court confirms the performer's rights to authorize a secondary
or additional use of the phonograph records and to receive addi-
tional compensation therefor. In the Whiteman case, on the other
hand, the court refused to extend the scope of the Copyright
Code via the guise of unfair competition and the doctrine of
moral right. The court was reluctant to resolve the composition
of substantial conflicts of interest since neither the common
law nor the statute had given any clue to its preference. 8r
If any relief can be given the performer it must come from
Congress. But any amendment of the statute which would give
the performer a statutory copyright is beset with difficulties.
The chief obstacle is who should receive the statutory copy-
right.187 An orchestral rendition requires the effort and skill of
many performers exclusive of the contributions of one or more
vocalists. The latter furnish artistic performances which should
be protected by statutory copyright. A copyright shared by all
performers is both unwieldy and impractical since the members
of an orchestra are constantly changing. This difficulty is miti-
186. RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); "... but we should be equallyjealous not to undertake the composition of substantial conflicts of interests
between which neither the common law, nor the [copyright] statute hasgiven any clue to its preference. We cannot know how Congress would
solve this issue; we can guess-and our guess is that it would refuse
relief as we are refusing it-but if our guess were the opposite, we should
have no right to enforce it." The Waring and Whiteman cases have pro-
voked a considerable amount of literature: Aberst, Use of the Doctrine of
Unfair Competition to Supplement Copyright in the Protection of Literary
and Musical Property, 29 KY. L. J. 271 (1941) ; Baer, Performer's Right to
Enjoin Unlicensed Broadcasts of Recorded Renditions, 19 N.C. L. REv. 202(1941); Bass, Interpretive Rights of Performing Artists, 42 DIcK. L. REV.
57 (1938); Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. R. 1289 (1940); Cline-
burK, Protection Afforded by the Law of Copyright to Recording Artists in
Their Interpretations of Musical Compositions, 20 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1941);
Countryman, The Organized Musicians, 16 U. OF CHI. L. Rnv. 239 (1949);
Doyle, Artists and Manufacturers' Interests in Record Rendition, 9 DuKE
B.AJ. 57 (1941); Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing
Artist in His Interpretive Rendition, I COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 9(1939) ; Shelton, The Protection of the Interpretive Rights of a Musical
Artist, I COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOsIuM 173 (1939); Traicoff, Rights of the
Performing Artist in His Interpretation and Performance, 11 AI L. REV.
225 (1940); Notes: 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 272 (1941); 11 Am L. REv. 205(1940); 9 FORD. L. REV. 425 (1940); 35 ILL. L. REV. 546 (1941); 26 IowA
L. REv. 384 (1941); 49 YALE L. J. 559 (1940).
187. Countryman, The Organized Musicians, 16 U. OF CHL L. REv. 239,
259 (1949).
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gated when an orchestra like "Waring's Pennsylvanians" is in-
corporated. It has been suggested that the copyright be given
the recording company; however, it hardly seems calculated to
bring the benefits of the copyright to the musical performer.188
NAPA has had incorporated in the various bills introduced in
Congress, the proposal that the copyright vest in the orchestra
conductor.' 89 It is doubtful whether this provision would benefit
the instrumentalists in the orchestra. It has also been suggested
that performers assign their statutory copyright to an agent
who would hold the copyright for licensing purposes. This pro-
posal is akin to the assignment by the copyright proprietor of
the small performing rights in musical compositions to ASCAP
or BMI. The difficulty with this suggestion is that it would be
more complex, unwieldy and burdensome than the copyright
problems attendant the use of music. A copyright in a perform-
ance would further subdivide the performing rights conferred
by the Copyright Code and fetter the radio, television and
motion picture industries in the use of talent. If statutory copy-
right is to be recognized in the performances of instrumentalists,
artists and motion picture, radio and television talent, it is sug-
gested that the copyright vest in one person or organization, viz.,
the record manufacturer or licensing agent and that Congress
spell out those provisions which would protect performers from
abuses of a licensing system and absolve users from liability for
innocent infringement.19
188. Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in His
Interpretive Rendition, I COPYRIGHT LAW SYmPosIUm 9, 31 (1939); Dia-
mond and Adler, Proposed Copyright Revisions and Phonograph Records,
11 AIR. L. REV. 29, 49 (1940) contends that the copyright should rest in the
record manufacturer because in an analogous situation statutory copyright
has already been given to the producer of a motion picture.
189. E.g., H. R. REP. No. 6160, 76 Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); Hearings on
H.R. 1269, H.R. 1270, and H.R. 2570, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1947);
"Mr. Walter: Mr. Speiser, if H.R. 1270 became a law, would not every
musician in a band be entitled to copyright his individual contribution to
the interpretation of a musical piece?
"Mr. Speiser: That would be true sir.... But we would regulate by as-
signment. The person entitled would be the conductor of the band or the
orchestral association under whose charter the band is performing....
The particular technicalities, sir, are of minor importance.... Due precau-
tion wouldbe taken before filing application of a copyright."
190. Ibid. 263-266. The Copyright Office disapproved the Scott Bill, H.R.
1270 because it was impossible to determine from its provisions where the
copyright would be lodged.
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TELEVISION PROGRAMS AND THE RIGHTS OF PERFORMING ARTISTS.
In the recent case of Peterson v. KMTR Radio Corporation,191
the "novel question" tendered a California inferior court was
"the right of a performer at a charity entertainment to collect
against a radio station that televised his performance without
his consent or permission." This is the first case in which any
court has rendered a published opinion which discusses whether
an artist may assert interpretative performing rights in a tele-
cast.192 The facts of this case as disclosed by the complaint and
the court's opinion warrant full statement. Plaintiffs are well
known aquatic stars who appeared in a "live" benefit perform-
ance for charity (the Mt. Sinai Hospital Cancer Fund) in Los
Angeles Swim Stadium. It is believed that plaintiffs were com-
pensated for their performances. In any event an admission fee
was charged to view the show. Plaintiffs' contract of employ-
ment with the entrepreneur or promoter, in this case the charity,
was silent on the disposition of television rights. Defendant,
licensee of television station KLAC telecast the show presumably
with the permission of the entrepreneur. Plaintiffs brought suit
against the station claiming that the defendant without their
knowledge or consent, made a motion picture film and television
representation of the performance and broadcast and dissemi-
nated for profit.
The complaint was premised on the following counts:
(a) invasion of right of privacy;
(b) reasonable value of work and services;
(c) and unfair competition.
The court confused and intermingled the two basic issues
tendered by this case:
Where the contract of employment is silent on the disposi-
tion of television performing rights, are they transferred by
operation of law, viz., implied contract to the entrepreneur
or are they residual rights retained by the performer?
191. 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044 (U.S. July 26, 1949).
192. In Chavez v. Hollywood Post No. 43 and Don Lee Broadcasting
System (Cal. Super. Ct. 1947) plaintiff, a professional boxer, attempted to
enjoin the telecasting of a match in which he was to engage, alleging that
he would be irreparably damaged, particularly since he was to receive a
percentage of the gross receipts. Plaintiff contends his right of privacy
would be invaded. The court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend
stating that the privacy doctrine was not involved, and that the entre-
preneur of the stadium owned the television rights since the latter were
included in the right to present the contest before a paid audience. See 10
FzD. Com. B. J. 36 (1949).
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Does our jurisprudence furnish a remedy for the protection
and enforcement of interpretative performing rights?
* At the outset it should be pointed out that television rights
are separate and distinct from motion picture and radio rights.
This is illustrated by the Weiss and Norman cases. In the former
case, the defendant who was the licensee of motion picture
rights, was enjoined from selling, exploiting or distributing the
television rights in a motion picture where the licensing agree-
ment was silent on the disposition of such rights.10 3 In the
Norman case, the question before the court was whether a lease
of the "privilege of broadcasting the boxing bouts," executed
in 1943, also included television rights. The court held that tele-
vision rights were separate and distinct from radio (aural)
rights and would be subject to negotiation between lessor and
lessee.194
In the case at bar the court conceded that plaintiffs had a
"property" interest in their television rights, but their failure
to reserve such rights resulted in a loss of the same. In other
words, television rights were impliedly assigned the entrepre-
neur. If this conclusion is correct, then the court need not have
inquired whether the common law would recognize and enforce
interpretative performing rights. The suggestion that television
rights be reserved was based on very practical considerations.
If contestants were to own radio, motion picture or television
rights to their performances, it would impose an onerous burden
on motion picture distributors and radio and television stations
to clear such events for public exhibition.
Despite these practical considerations, it is believed that the
court erred, in concluding that plaintiffs' television rights were
impliedly assigned the entrepreneur. Firstly, the customs and
practices of the entertainment industry suggest that an entre-
preneur in contracting for a "live" performance of a vaudeville
act, does not also acquire the radio, television, and motion pic-
ture rights to the same. If an entrepreneur expects to make a
secondary use of a "live" act, viz., for radio or television pur-
poses, the performer is usually compensated for such enlarged
distribution. These practices are confirmed by the collective bar-
193. Weiss v. Hollywood Film Enterprises, Inc., 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2044
(U.S. July 26, 1949) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
194. Norman v. Century Athletic Club, Inc., 69 A.2d 466 (Md. 1950);
5 RADIO REGULATIONS 2057 (1949).
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gaining agreements of such organizations as the American Guild
of Variety Artists, Actor's Equity Association, American Feder-
ation of Radio Artists, etc.195
Secondly, by analogy to the copyright cases, licensing agree-
ments are construed in derogation of the rights of the grantee.19
Thus the grant by contract, when motion pictures were a famil-
iar mode of representation, of the "sale and exclusive license to
produce, perform and represent" a copyright play, assigned only
stage rights.9 T Similarly, a license granting dramatic rights did
not include "talking motion picture rights."'198 To be sure, there
are cases to the contrary. Thus the assignment of dramatic
rights has been held to include motion picture rights although
motion pictures were unknown at the time when the assignment
was made. 99 All of the cases dealing with this subject can be
reconciled and distinguished on a factual basis. It is believed that
the courts, as in the Norman case, must recognize that the tele-
vision rights have an economic value to the copyright proprietor
or the entrepreneur and that they are separate and distinct
from radio or motion picture rights. 200
It is submitted that the television rights were not impliedly
transferred to the entrepreneur; on the contrary, they were re-
tained by the plaintiffs. The basic issue thus tendered is whether
any statutory or common law remedy could be invoked by plain-
tiffs to protect and enforce their television performing rights.
195. E.g., the collective agreement of Actors' Equity Association provides
that actors taking part in a performance broadcast wholly or in part are
entitled to a minimum supplementary remuneration of one-eighth of a
week's salary, or the minimum fee required by the American Federation
of Radio Artists for such a broadcast, whichever is the higher. Actors ap-
pearing in a motion picture, radio, or television broadcast are entitled to
an additional minimum fee of one week's salary for each day or part thereof
employed.
196. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT, 143-144 (1939); WEIL, COPYRIGHT
LAw, 554 (1917).
197. Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920); Harper Bros. v. Klaw,
232 Fed. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Klein v. Beach, 232 Fed. 240 (S.D.N.Y.
1916).
198. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong, 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163 (1933);
cf. L. C. Page & Co. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196, 199
(2d Cir. 1936).
199. Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (2d Cir. 1910); Photo
Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Co., 220 Fed. 448 (2d Cir.
1915); Frohman v. Fitch, 164 App. Div. 231, 149 N.Y. Supp. 633 (1914).
And see WIL, COPYRIGHT LAW, 555-556 (1917).
200. Norman v. Century Athletic Club, Inc., 69 A.2d 466 (Md. 1950).
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The Copyright Code. Artists such as the plaintiffs in the
Peterson case can protect and enforce interpretative performing
rights by preserving their performances on film and registering
the same with the Copyright Office as a motion picture photo-
play201 or as a motion picture other than a photoplay.202 If the
performance tells a story, the script may be registered with the
Copyright Office as a dramatic composition.20 3 Statutory copy-
right may be invoked by performers provided they are the pro-
prietors of the work seeking statutory protection. The benefits
of the Copyright Code are not available to performers as dis-
tinguished from proprietors. 204
Common Law Copyright. The complaint in the Peterson case
did not allege infringement of common law copyright. This is
surprising in the light of the Waring and related decisions which
have held tlat common law copyright is present in the musical
rendition by an orchestra20 5 and in the performance of an actor
or singer.20 6 Complainants may have been precluded from invok-
ing this theory because their common law rights may have been
lost by publication.
Right of Privacy. The court devoted more attention to this
cause of action than the two other counts. We have discussed
the applicability of the privacy doctrine to program content else-
where.207 For present purposes, public performers can hardly in-
voke the privacy doctrine to protect their mental interests. Com-
plainants would be hard pressed to show that the defendant had
interfered with their personal, private or seclusive interests.
For all practical purposes, the privacy count is a camouflage for
the assertion of pecuniary rights by performers. This, as we
have discussed in the preceding section, is a subsidiary right of
le droit moral which is not recognized in our purisprudence.2°8
201. COPYRIGHT CODE, 61 Stat. 652, 17 U.S.C. § 5(1) (Supp. 1950).
202. Id. § 25(m).
203. Id. § 25(d).
204. See note 125 supra.
205. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 AtI.
631 (1937); cf. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
206. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338, 340 (D.C.N.C. 1939); Savage
v. Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908); cf. Long v. Decca Records,
Inc., 76 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
207. Warner, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE CONTENT OF RADIO AND TELE-
VISION PROGRAS,-IowA L. REV. (1950).
208. Mr. Justice Hand in R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 327 Pa. 433, 194
Atl. 631 (1937) : "It scarcely seems necessary to discuss the strange asser-
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Implied Contract. Plaintiffs claimed in this count that the
defendant was indebted to them "for reasonable value of work,
labor and services performed by the plaintiff for the defendant
at its request.. ." The basis for a cause of action founded on im-
plied contract is a course of conduct by the parties showing a
mutual intention to contract. The conduct of the plaintiffs and
defendant negates any such contractual understanding.20 9 As the
court stated:
"The plaintiffs are no more entitled to recover upon the
quantum meruit theory from the broadcasting company, in
my opinion, than the cameraman who took the motion pic-
tures is entitled to recover from the plaintiffs for his ser-
vices. It is said the broadcasting company received financial
benefits from plaintiffs' services. By a parity of reasoning
it might be said the plaintiffs benefited by having the
cameraman make the motion picture of their performance.
In either case, however, the element of a promise, express
or implied, to pay for such services is lacking."
Unfair Competition. An analysis of this count discloses that
the unfair competition complained of was indirect, i. e., that
the wide-spread dissemination of plaintiffs' performance via a
telecast or motion pictures would diminish the commercial value
of their act by making it increasingly difficult to obtain engage-
ments and adequate renumeration therefor. This approach dis-
pensed with direct or marked competition in its attempt to apply
the "misappropriation theory" of the Associated Press case. The
court rejected this theory. It held that an action founded on un-
fair competition did not lie since there was no "passing off" and
the parties were not true competitors. This conclusion is sur-
prising since the California courts do not consider "passing off"
and direct or "market" competition as jurisdictional prerequi-
sites to an unfair competition action. 210
The court then characterized the third cause of action as "one
for damages resulting from the alleged illegal use of plaintiffs'
property, i.e., the television and motion picture rights." The
remedy suggested for the protection of such property was the
tion that to broadcast the records in some way invades somebody's 'right
of privacy,' presumably Whiteman's."
209. CLARK, CONTRACTS 19 ff. (1931).
210. See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948),
wherein the court in construing California law, applied the misappropria-
tion theory of the Associated Press case; Sunbeam Corporation v. Sunbeam
Lighting Co., 83 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
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reservation by plainiffs of their television and motion picture
rights. The failure to reserve such rights precludes the per-
former from instituting suit against the "one who broadcasts his
performance."
When the court referred to the third cause of action, as one
involving the illegal use of plaintiffs' property, it was employing
the verbiage of the doctrine of moral right and its subsidiary
* rights. -This language suggests that the interests of performing
artists warrant protection on the theory of work done. The
logical consequences of this theory would permit performers to
assert authorization and pecuniary rights under a common law
cause of action described as "one for damages resulting from
the alleged illegal use of plaintiffs' property."... As a matter
of fact the three counts in the Peterson case were a camouflage
for the assertion of authorization and pecuniary rights by
plaintiffs.
As we have suggested in the previous section, the introduction
of the doctrine of moral right and its subsidiary rights into our
jurisprudence should be effectuated by legislative remedies
rather than by the common law. This doctrine necessitates the
adoption of legislative standards to guide the courts in their
application of this new juridical concept. In addition a legis-
lative standard is an effective instrumentality to resolve the
conflicting interests which would be affected by this doctrine.
We therefore conclude that the common law as exemplified by
the complaint does not furnish a remedy for the protection and
enforcement of interpretative performing rights in a telecast.
This does not mean that a performer cannot protect himself.
Common law or statutory copyright may furnish a remedy. More
important, if he is a member of one of the unions connected with
"show business," the collective bargaining agreements will in all
probability protect his television performing rights.211
The likelihood of litigation such as is exemplified by the Peter-
son case, is remote. In all contracts of employments between
athletic stars or vaudeville performers and entrepreneurs, the
parties specifically bargain for and dispose of in writing the
radio, motion picture and television rights.
This case must be limited to its precise facts-that a cause of
action founded on right of privacy and unfair competition does
211. See supra note 76.
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not furnish a remedy to protect and enforce interpretative per-
forming rights. It must be distinguished from the Louis-Walcott
litigation2 12 in that in the latter, the proprietor as distinguished
from the performing artist was seeking to enjoin an unauthor-
ized telecast. To be sure, in the Louis-Walcott litigation, the
fighters were joined as parties-plaintiffs. But the brunt of the
litigation was borne by the stations, network and sponsor and
they, in their proprietary capacity could enjoin an unauthorized
telecast without recourse to the performing rights of the con-
testants.
DESIGN PIRACY
The thesis of this chapter is that the law of unfair competi-
tion should not be used as a substitute for copyright protection;
that the former should be employed to protect word or program
when common law or statutory copyright are inadequate.
This theory is challenged by the "design piracy" cases.
213
The copying of other manufacturers' styles and designs in the
ready-to-wear industry is called "style" or "design piracy."
Style as applied to a dress refers to its general characteristics,
such as the length of the skirt, the size of the sleeve, the height
of the waist, etc.; while design as applied to a dress includes all
the details involved in its make-up. A style is a type, while a
design is an interpretation of the style.
Styles and designs embodying as they do artistic and intellec-
tual effort, are considered original creations; they possess a sub-
stantial economic value for an extremely short period of time.
This is confirmed by the following: the dress industry has five
seasons, spring, summer, fall, winter and winter-resort seasons.
A manufacturer must furnish a line of samples for each season.
The cost to produce a single line is between $30,000 and $50,000.
The "style" life of a dress, i. e., the period between the first
order and the last substantial reorder is usually not more than
three months.
The basic issue tendered is whether statutory or common law
212. This litigation is discussed in detail in WARNER, RADio AND TELE-
VISION LAW, § 210(a) (1949).
213. For excellent discussions of the "design piracy" problems see: Der-
enberg, Is Piracy of Dress Designs an Actionable Wrong?, 31 T.M. BuLL.
57 (1936); Callmann, Style and Design Piracy, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 557
(1940). There is an excellent explanation of the "design piracy" case in
Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion Originator's Guild of America, 90 F.2d
556, 557 (1st Cir. 1937).
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remedies may be invoked to protect original designs. Copying
destroys the style and design values of dresses which are copied.
Women will not purchase dresses at a higher price at one store
if dresses which look the same are offered at another store at
half those prices. Copying thus reduces the number and amount
of reorders. In addition manufacturers do not buy materials in
as large quantities as they otherwise would. This tends to in-
crease the cost of dresses and the prices at which they must be
sold.
The first question presented is whether the design patent law21'
will protect an original design. The design patent law is ineffec-
tive for several reasons.
Firstly, it requires the same standard of originality and
novelty as in the case of mechanical inventions.215 Obviously the
214. REV. STAT. §§ 4929, 4933 (1875) as amended, 35 U.S.C. § 73 (1946):
"Any person who has invented any new, original, and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture, not known or used by others in this country
before his invention thereof, and not patented or described in any printed
publication in this or any foreign country before his invention thereof, or
more than one year prior to his application, and not in public use or on sale
in this country for more than one year prior to his application, unless the
same is proved to have been abandoned, may, upon payment of the fees
required by law and other due proceedings had, the same as in cases of
inventions or discoveries covered by section 31 of this title, obtain a patent
therefor.
"All the regulations and provisions which apply to obtaining or protecting
patnts for inventions or discoveries not inconsistent with the provisions
of this title, shall apply to patents for designs."
215. In re Faustmann, 155 F.2d 388, 392 (C.C.P.A.) : "Thus it is seen
that the authority for granting a design patent is based upon four proposi-
tions-the design must be new, original, ornamental, and must be the
product of invention .... The greatest difficulty encountered has been in
determining the question of the existence of invention.... It has been a
uniform holding of this court, following the settled law announced by other
courts, that the production of a design patent must involve the element of
invention and it is well-settled that no lesser degree of inventive skill is re-
quired in the production of designs than other kinds of patented arti-
cles (cases cited and discussed infra)." For the attitude of the Patent Office,
see opinion of former Commissioner Ooms in Ex parte Norman, 69 U.S.P.Q.
553 (1946) ; Nat Lewis Purses, Inc., v. Carole Bags, Inc., 83 F.2d 475, 476(2d Cir. 1936): "... a design patent must be the product of 'invention,' by
which we meant the same exceptional talent that is required for a mechan-
ical patent .... True, the piracy of designs, especially in wearing apparel,
has been often denounced as a serious evil and perhaps it is; perhaps new
designs ought to be entitled to a limited copyright. Efforts have been made
to induce Congress to change the law so as to give some such protection,
without success thus far; and until it does, new designs are open to all,
unless their production demands some salient ability." See also: Verney
Corporation v. Rose Fabric Converters Corporation, 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.
N.Y. 1949); White v. Leanore Frocks, Inc., 120 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1941);
Roseweb Frocks, Inc. v. Moe Feinberg-Mor Wiesen, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 979(S.D. N.Y. 1941); Belding Heniinway Co. v. Future Fashions, Inc., 143
F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1944).
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styles and designs for the dress industry do not demand pure
originality; they reflect artistic and intellectual effort which
have been applied and embodied in a new or novel way to a
manufactured product. Because of this requirement of original-
ity in the "inventive sense," it has been estimated that 90 per
cent of the applications for design patents are refused upon the
first search.211
Secondly, the time consumed in obtaining a design patent
generally makes it valueless. Each design requires a thorough
search in and by the Patent Office. By the time the necessary pa-
pers are filed with the Patent Office, the search concluded, etc,
the "style" life of the dress has long since terminated. Such pro-
tection as is afforded by the patent law is illusory because when
the patent is issued the design has been copied and its economic
value has expired.217
Thirdly, the cost of securing letters patent is from $25 to $100
per design. With the silk industry alone registering a minimum
of 100,000 designs with its Industrial Design Registration
Bureau, the cost would be prohibitive to the individual manu-
facturer who may wish to register several hundred designs per
season.
2 1 1
The deficiencies of the design patent law are substantial, hence
it cannot be invoked to protect creative designs. The next ques-
tion is whether the Copyright Code provides a remedy.
The judicial interpretation of applicable sections of the Copy-
right Code requires the copyright notice to be inscribed on each
repeat of the design. This destroys the merchantability and com-
mercial value of the fabric since the copyright notice may appear
frequently in but one yard of the goods. 19
216. Testimony of Sylvan Gotshal in Hearings before the House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Patents for Revision of Copyright Laws, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 841, 842 (1936); see also Hearings before a Subcommittee
on Patents, Trade Marks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 2860, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and particularly the statements
of Sam B. Warner, Register of Copyrights, at pp. 29, 34 if.; Sylvan Gotshal,
at pp. 27 and 57 ff.; and Karl Fenning at pp. 10 and 31 if.
217. See the testimony of Miss Mary Bendelare at the 1936 Patent Hear-
ings, 699, 920, 964.
218. Supra note 216. Since 1914, numerous bills have been introduced
in the House and Senate for design protection. Weikert, Design Piracy, 19
IND. L. J. 235, 245-247 (1944), lists 32 bills intermittently before the House
and Senate from 1914 to 1935.
219. DeJonge & Company v. Breuker & Kessler Company, 235 U.S. 33,
36 (1914). "Every reproduction of a copyrighted work must bear the stat-
utory notice... It is suggested that it is overtechnical to require a repeti-
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Secondly, the Copyright Office in permitting the registration
* of artistic drawings which are subsequently used for articles of
manufacture, confers no exclusive right to make and sell the
article illustrated. "To give an author or designer an exclusive
right to manufacture the article described in the certificate of
copyright registration, when no examination of its novelty has
ever been made, would unjustly create a monopoly and moreover
would usurp the functions of letter patent. 2 2 0 In addition, there
is some doubt whether a dress design is sufficiently artistic in
nature to be the subject of copyright protection. The judicial
interpretation of the term "artistic nature" excludes designs for
industrial purposes which are utilitarian in character.
2 2 1
It would appear that the Copyright Code cannot be invoked
to protect original designs. May common law copyright or the
law of unfair competition furnish a remedy? Although a dress
design constitutes an original intellectual production, there is
a general publication or loss of such common law rights since
the general public may purchase dresses embodying the original
design.222
The final common law remedy available is the law of unfair
competition. Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corporatio223 is de-
tion of the notice upon every square in a single sheet that makes a harmoni-
ous whole. This argument tacitly assumes that we can look to such a larger
unity as the sheet possesses. But that unity is only the unity of a design
that is not patented.... The appellant is claiming the same rights as if
this work were one of the masterpieces of the world, and he must take them
with the same limitations that would apply to a portrait, a holy family,
or a scene of war." See also Verney Corporation v. Rose Fabric Converters
Corporation et al., 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); cf. Kemp & Beatley,
Inc., v. Hirsch et al., 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
220. Adelman v Sonner's & Gordon, Inc., 21 U.S.P.Q. 218 (D.C.N.Y.
1934) ; Kemp & Beatley, Inc., v. Hirsch et al., 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) ;
Verney Corporation v. Rose Fabric Converters Corporation et al., 87 F.Supp.
802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
221. Kemp & Beatley, Inc., v. Hirsch et aL, 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
In Burke v. Spicers Dress Designs, [1936] 1 All. E.R. 99, plaintiffs brought
an action under the English Copyright Act, 1911 1 & 2 GEO. 5, c. 46, to
restrain infringement by copying a sketch of a design for a lady's dress
and the dress itself. The Court, per Clauson, J., held that the frock was
not an "original work of artistic workmanship," hence it was not protected
by the Copyright Act. And see cases cited in Verney Corporation v. Rose
Fabric Converters Corporation et al., 87 F.Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
222. Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission,
109 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1940); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild of America, Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F.2d
80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
223. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930);
Verney Corporation v. Rose Fabric Converters Corporation et al., 87
l.Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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cisive on this issue. Defendant copied one of plaintiff's popular
and original silk designs. As the court's opinion points out, not
more than one-fifth of the designs created each season catch the
public fancy. "It is in practice impossible and it would be very
onerous if it were not, to secure design patents upon all of these;
it would be impossible to know in advance which would sell well
and patent only those. Besides, it is probable that for the most
part they have no such originality as would support a design
patent. Again, it is impossible to copyright them under the Copy-
right Act .... or at least so the authorities of the Copyright
Office hold." 224
Plaintiff's request for protection of its design during the
season was denied. "In the absence of some recognized right at
common law, or under the statutes-and the plaintiff claims
neither-a man's property is limited to the chattels which em-
body his invention. Others may imitate these at their pleasure
. . . . This is confirmed by the doctrine of 'nonfunctional' features,
under which it is held that to imitate these is to impute to the
copy the same authorship as the original." Mr. Justice Learned
Hand, speaking for the court, refused to extend the ruling of the
Associated Press case beyond printed news dispatches. "It ap-
pears to us incredible that the Supreme Court (in the Associated
Press case) should have had in mind any such consequences. To
exclude others from the enjoyment of a chattel is one thing; to
prevent any imitation of it, to set up a monopoly in the plan of
its structure, gives the author a power over his fellows vastly
greater, a power which the Constitution allows only Congress to
create."
Mr. Justice Hand then recognized the inadequacy of the pres-
ent statutes:
"True, it would seem as though the plaintiff had suffered a
grievance for which there should be a remedy, perhaps by
amendment of the Copyright Law, assuming that this does
not already cover the case, which is not urged here. It seems
a lame answer in such a case to turn the injured party out of
court but there are larger issues at stake than his redress.
Judges have only a limited power to amend the law; when
the subject has been confided to a Legislature, they must
stand aside, even though there be a hiatus in completed jus-
tice. An omission in such cases must be taken to have been
224. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW, 124-125 (2d ed. 1947).
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as deliberate as though it were express, certainly after long-
standing action on the subject-matter. Indeed, we are not
in any position to pass upon the questions involved, as Bran-
deis, J., observed in International News Service v. Asso-
ciated Press. We must judge upon records prepared by liti-
gants, which do not contain all that may be relevant to the
issues, for they cannot disclose the conditions of this in-
dustry, or of the others that may be involved. Congress
might see its way to create some sort of temporary right, or
it might not. Its decision would certainly be preceded by
some examination of the result upon the other interests af-
fected. Whether these would prove paramount we have no
means of saying; it is not for us to decide. Our vision is
inevitably contracted, and the whole horizon may contain
much which will compose a very different picture. 2 2 1
A New York case, decided two years later, did furnish pro-
tection to an original unpatented and non-copyrighted design.220
This case can be distinguished factually from the Cheney Broth-
ers case. Plaintiffs, manufacturers of ladies coats, submitted 39
sample coats to defendant, a mail order house, which sells arti-
cles of wearing, apparel throughout the United States. Defen-
dant returned all but one sample. The latter was turned over to
another manufacturer who copied plaintiff's original design.
The court granted plaintiff's request for injunction and com-
pelled the defendant to account for profits made on the style in
controversy.
The injury to plaintiffs was the piracy of their original de-
225. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corporation, 35 F.2d 279, 281, (2d Cir.
1929); Verney Corporation v. Rose Fabric Converters Corporation et al.,
87 F.Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). "As to the second count for unfair
competition, the case is indistinguishable from Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp., 2 Cir., 35 F.2d 279, certiorari denied, 281 U.S. 728, 50 S.Ct. 245, 74
L. Ed. 1145, where it was held that anyone might copy plaintiff's silk
patterns which had not been protected by a design patent or by a copyright.
See also Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 2 Cir., 108 F.2d 16, certiorari denied,
309 U.S. 660, 60 S.Ct. 514, 84 L. Ed. 1008, and Electric Auto-Lite Co. v.
P. & D. Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 109 F.2d 566. The New York law is also in accord
with these decisions. Mavco, Inc., v. Hampdon Sales Ass'n, 273 App. Div.
297, 77 N.Y.S.2d 510; Margolis et aL, v. National Bellas Hess Co., Inc.,
139 Misc. 738, 249 N.Y.Supp. 175." See also Derenberg, Is Piracy of Dress
Designs an Actionable Wrong? 31 BuLL. U.S. TRADE-MARK Ass'N 57
(1936) ; Wolff, Is Design Piracy Unfair Competition? 23 J. PAT. AFF. Soc.
431 (1941).
226. Margolis et al., v. National Bellas Hess Co., Inc., 139 Misc. 738
249 N.Y.Supp. 175 (1931), aff'd without opinion, 235 App.Div. 839, 25q
N.Y.Supp. 912 (1932). Judge Merrell dissented on the ground that plain-
tiffs' sole remedy was an action to recover damages for breach of contract.
See also Mavco, Inc., v. Hampdon Sales Ass'n et al., 273 App.Div. 297, 77
N.Y.S.2d 510 (1948).
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sign. The case did not involve statutory patent or copyright.
The design was not obtained by fraudulent means, nor did it
involve any "palming off" of the defendant's product as plain-
tiffs'. Equitable relief was furnished on the basis of the follow-
ing principles:
"1. Where an original design, not copyrighted or patented,
is published, or put on the market, the owner's property
is limited to the articles which embody his design, Subject
to the restrictions hereafter noted, others may copy the
design without compensation and without acknowledgment
and offer it for sale at will.
"2. Where such design is not put on the market or pub-
lished, it will be protected at common law and others may
be restricted from copying it.
"3. Notwithstanding publication of such design, its copy-
ing will be restricted if it involves a breach of of contract
or of trust, or if the design was obtained by fraudulent
or unfair means.
"4. In any case, in order to protect such design (not
patented or copyrighted), there must not only be substantial
identity, but the identity must be due to the copying of
plaintiffs' designs. Similarity in and of itself will not
suffice except under certain conditions in cases of 'palming
off.' PY2
The design piracy cases illustrate our thesis: that the law of
unfair competition should be applied since neither the design
patent law, the Copyright Code nor the common law adequately
protects original dress designs. But the Cheney Brothers case
negates our theory. The court refused to permit the law of un-
fair competition to supply deficiencies in the design patent law
or the Copyright Code. Here again there are substantial and
conflicting interests whose differences can best be resolved by the
formulation of a comprehensive policy by the legislature. 
2 2
The Cheney Brothers case therefore modifies our basic thesis.
227. Margolis et al., v. National Bellas Hess Co., Inc., 139 Misc. 738, 741,
249 N.Y.Supp. 175, 179 (1931); cf. Montegut et al., v. Hickson, Inc., 178
App.Div. 94, 164 N.Y.Supp. 858 (1917) ; Cornibert v. Cohn et al., 169 Misc.
285, 7 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1938).
228. Since 1914 numerous bills have been introduced in the House and
Senate of Congress for design protection. Copyright registration proposals
have been the most frequent of which the various Vestal bills are best
known. See H.R. REP. No. 11852, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1930) discussed
in a1 CALIF. L. Rnv. 477 (1931); Weikert, Design Piracy, 19 IND. L. J. 235,
245-247 (1944) lists thirty-two bills intermittently before the House and
Senate from 1914 to 1935. For the most recent hearings on design protec-
tion legislation, see Hearings on HR. Rep. No. 2860, supra note ?16.
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The law of unfair competition will not complement the deficien-
cies of the Copyright Code, where to do so would require the
courts to resolve substantial conflicting interests, which the
legislature is better equipped to resolve.
THE ADVERTISING CASES
For all practical purposes the advertising content of radio and
television programs is copyrightable. The courts have been ex-
tremely liberal in finding originality and artistic merit in an
elaborate variety of printed matter. 2 9
However, the great bulk of advertising matter is not regis-
tered with the Copyright Office. 230 An advertiser seeks the aid
of the courts when his competitor misappropriates his advertis-
ing material. Since he cannot invoke the remedies of the Copy-
right Code because of non-compliance with its statutory formali-
ties, he brings an unfair competition action to enjoin the mis-
appropriation of his advertising material. The following cases
illustrate the extreme reluctance of the courts to use the law of
unfair competition as a substitute for copyright protection:
In International Hearing Co. v. Oliver Oil Gas Burner &
Machine Co.,2 31 a former employee of the plaintiff who had as-
sisted in the preparation of plaintiff's advertising copy, organ-
ized the defendant corporation and used in defendant's adver-
tisements certain words, phrases and sentences and in general
outline the pictorial illustrations and representations of plain-
tiff's advertisements. "If the defendant company has been guilty
of unfair competition, it is not because of the wrongful use of
confidential information acquired by Grafe during his employ-
ment by plaintiff, but because of imitation of plaintiff's adver-
tisement and deception of the public .... we are here dealing
with advertisements and not with the dress in which the burners
of the respective parties were offered to customers over the
counter by retail dealers. Similarity of dress is enjoined as un-
fair competition, because customers, calling for an article, do
not stop to read printed names and addresses, or to observe dif-
229. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903);
Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932).
230. Borden, Copyright of Advertising, 35 Ky. L. J. 205 (1947);
Freeland, Copyright Protection of Advertising, 27 KY. L. J. 391 (1939);
Note 45 HARV. L. Rnv. 542 (1932).
231. 288 Fed. 708 (8th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 714 (1923).
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ferences which may distinguish the simulated article from the
one called for. They are satisfied with general appearances. But
a customer obtained through an advertisement must of necessity
read the advertisement to become acquainted with the article
advertised and to know the name and address of the advertiser.
Plaintiff's advertisements describe the Oliver oil gas burner and
give plaintiff's name as Oliver Oil Gas Burner & Machine Com-
pany, with its address. No sensible person acquainted with
plaintiff's advertisements would believe that the defendant com-
pany was advertising and selling plaintiff's burner."23 2
In Westminster Laundry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., plaintiff
ran a "blind" advertisement with the coined word, "Stopur-
kicken," intending, after arousing public curiosity to associate
this word with its laundry business. Before this association was
completed, defendant, a manufacturer of envelopes, distributed
envelopes bearing the coined word. Defendant's conduct was not
regarded as an unfair competitive practice since no "palming off"
was involved.233
In Crump Co. v. Lindsey,234 the plaintiff prepared a catalogue
for automobile parts. Twenty or more pages of defendant's cata-
logue were photographic copies of plaintiff's catalogue, other-
wise the catalogues were not similar. Plaintiff's bill for an in-
junction on the ground of unfair competition was dismissed ....
"from any standpoint such a method of business is unquestion-
ably unfair, and is not supported by any right of the company
232. Ibid.
233. Westminster Laundry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., 174 Mo. App. 238,
156 S.W. 767 (1913); Edward Hilker Mop Co. v. United States Mop Co.,
et al., 191 Fed. 613 (6th Cir. 1911): "The circulars sent defendant's agents
were apparently copied in substantial respects, from complainant's circulars
to its agents. The similarity is such that, if intended or likely to be given
to the ultimate purchaser, we should be disposed to hold that the ultimate
purchaser who had seen complainant's circulars was likely to be deceived
by defendant's circulars into purchasing in the belief that the goods were
those of complainant's manufacture. But the nature of the circulars issued
by both parties was such, containing as they did instructions to apd a
schedule of large compensations paid agents, that it seems quite unlikely
that they would naturally fall into the hands of the ultimate purchaser. It
is urged that as defendant's circulars furnish 'talking points' identical in
many respects with those in complainant's circulars to its agents, the pros-
pective purchaser may well be deceived by the similarity of the arguments
used by agents. It seems to me that this possibility is rather remote. The
rule is well settled that nothing less than conduct tending to pass off one
man's business or merchandise as that of another will constitute unfair
competition." To the same effect is Viavi Co. v. Vimedia Co., et al., 245 Fed.
289 (8th Cir. 1917).
234. 130 Va. 144, 166, 107 S.E. 679, 686 (1921).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss4/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
so acting to so appropriate and use the result of the work and
expenditure of another. But under our system of jurisprudence
a court of equity will not adjudicate an abstract question of
whether a defendant possesses a right of conduct." Defendant's
conduct decreased his expenditures and correspondingly in-
creased his profits, but it did not tend to lessen plaintiff's profits,





The foregoing cases are fairly typical. They illustrate that
the law of unfair competition will not be used as a substitute for
the Copyright Code to protect advertising content. Of course, if
the imitation of advertisements involves the usual elements of
unfair competition, viz., palming off, deception or confusion to
the public, etc., such unfair practices will be enjoined.23  But
the misappropriation theory of the Associated Press case has not
and should not be extended to protect advertising content since
the Copyright Code furnishes adequate protection.
235. Ibid. In Potter Drug & Chemical Corp. v. Pasfield Soap Co., 10
Fed. 490 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1900), aff'd. 106 Fed. 914 (2nd Cir. 1901), plain-
tiff used the word "Cuticura" as a trade-mark for a toilet soap. Defendant
marketed a toilet soap tnder the name "Cuticle Soap" and in circulars
enclosed in the wrapper copied some of the reading matter from plaintiff's
circulars. The name "Cuticle" was printed in a style similar to that in
which plaintiff's "Cuticura" was printed. The court held that this did not
establish unfair competition since defendant's soap was colored differently
and the wrappers on each cake and the cartons in which a number of
cakes were boxed were dissimilar in color and general appearance. To the
same effect are: A. J. Krank Mfg. Co. v. Pabst, 277 Fed. 15 (6th Cir. 1921),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 580; Schulte v. Colorado Fire & Leather Co., 259 Fed.
562 (8th Cir. 1919); Farmers' Handy Wagon Co. v. Beaver Silo & Box
Mfg. Co., 236 Fed. 731 (7th Cir. 1916); S. R. Feil Co. v. Robbins Co., 220Fed. 650 (7th Cir. 1915).
236. NIms, UNFAIR COMPTITION AND TRADE-MARKS (4th ed. 1947), p.
953: "Where a defendant has taken from plaintiff's advertising prospec-
tuses whole clauses which he then has used in his own literature, or has
reproduced verbatim the descriptive matter in plaintiff's catalogues and
copied the cuts, code words, and so forth, an injunction will be granted.
Where defendant obtained from plaintiff advertising material, cuts anddies to be used in selling plaintiff's product, or secured such material
by breach of trust, its use by defendant to advertise his own product, in
competition with plaintiff's, will be enjoined.... Most of the cases in which
the imitation of advertisements has been condemned have involved the usual
elements of unfair competition; that is, they involved a tendency to mislead
purchasers and to pass off goods. But there is a question whether short of
this, there may not be an inequitable appropriation of the benefit of
advertising, which is unfair."
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CONCLUSION
The basic thesis of this chapter is that the law of unfair com-
petition has not and should not be employed as a substitute for
common law or statutory copyright. This is premised on the re-
luctance of the courts to establish monopolies in words, phrases
and ideas and thus remove them from public circulation.237
Our thesis is illustrated by the advertising cases. The law of
unfair competition has not been used as a substitute for the
Copyright Code to protect advertising content since the latter
furnishes adequate protection.2 38 Conversely, the law of unfair
competition will be employed to complement common law and
statutory copyright when the latter cannot protect program con-
tent. In the "news"2 9 and "sports240 cases, the courts have em-
ployed the law of unfair competition to protect word and pro-
gram content since neither the common law nor the Copyright
Code furnished a remedy. On the other hand the courts have
refused to enjoin "design piracy" via the law of unfair competi-
tion despite the inadequacies of the design patent law and the
Copyright Code. The courts are loath to resolve substantial and
conflicting interests whose differences can and should be solved
by the formulation of a comprehensive policy by the legisla-
ture.241
Performing artists have invoked the law of unfair competition
to protect their interpretive rights. It is believed that the great
majority of the courts will refuse to recognize performing rights
237. E.g., International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215(1918); Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 46
F. Supp. 198 (D.C. Mass. 1942).
238. Cf. International Heating Co. v. Oliver Oil Gas Burner & Machine
Co., 288 Fed. 708 (8th Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 714 (1923); Crump
Co. v. Lindsay, Inc., 130 Va. 144, 107 S.E. 679 (1921) ; Westminster Laun-
dry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., 174 Mo. App. 238, 156 S.W. 767 (1913).
239. Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcasting Ass'n, 2 C.C.H. § 7052
1933), appeal dismissed by stipulation, 68 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1933);
Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (D.C. Wash. 1934), re-
versed, 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 299
U.S. 269 (1936).
240. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490(D.C. Pa. 1938); Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal Pictures Co.,
225 App.Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1938); Rudolph Mayer Pictures Inc. v.
Pathe News Inc., 235 App. Div. 774, 255 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1932); Mutual
Broadcasting System Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 177 Misc. 489, 30 N.Y.S.2d 419(1941); Twentieth-Century Sporting Club v. Trans-Radio Press Service,
165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.S. 159 (1937).
241. Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
4nid 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
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whether under the guise of unfair competition, libel, right of
privacy or equitable relief, since to do so would result in the
*pro tanto recognition of le droit nral. 42 The latter is alien to
our jurisprudence and requires legislation in order to be recog-
nized.
With regard to television programs per se, it is believed that
the courts should have little or no occasion to employ the law of
unfair competition to protect program content. The Copyright
Code furnishes adequate protection. Thus dramatic programs
can be registered with the Copyright Office as a dramatic com-
position.243 or the script of a program may be classified as a lec-
ture or similar program prepared for oral delivery. 44 If the
television program contains songs, the proprietor thereof may
obtain statutory copyright on all musical compositions. 2" If the
television program has been preserved on film, copyright may be
secured as a motion picture photoplay2 6 or as a motion picture
other than a photoplay.247
A neat question is tendered whether news or sports programs
on television may be registered under Copyright Code. If the
program is preserved on film, it is believed that the Copyright
Office would register it as a photoplay, or motion picture other
than a photoplay.
Prior to the Woody Woodpecker248 and Miracle Record2 49
cases, it was believed that common law copyright would protect
television news and sports programs. Common law copyright
has been defined previously as rights in an original intellectual
production. The various rights protected by common law copy-
right are frequently lost because of the technical legal concept
known as "publication." The latter may be described as an act
of the proprietor whereby the subject matter is made available
to the general public under circumstances permitting copies to
242. Cf. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
243. 37 CODE FnD. RE. § 202.5 (1948).
244. Id. at § 202.4.
245. Id. at § 202.6.
246. Id. at § 202.13.
247. Id. at § 202.14.
248. Blanc. v. Lantz et al., 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949). This
case is discussed in detail in Warner rotection of the Content of Radio
and Television Programs by Com'non law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. REV. 209,
234 ff. (1950).
249. Shapiro Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F. Supp.
473 (D.C. Ill. 1950).
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be made or which indicates an intention of rendering the work
common property and imply an abandonment and dedication of
the work to the general public.2 50
There can be no doubt that a television news or sports pro-
gram constitutes an original intellectual production. It requires
the use of technical and artistic skills-viz., lighting effects,
camera angles, integration of sight and sound to produce a
finished television production.
But the Woody Woodpecker and Miracle Record cases chal-
lenge the concept of publication and cast doubt on those de-
cisions which hold that the broadcast of a radio program is
neither an abandonment of common law rights nor a dedication
of the same to the general public.25 1 If the principle of publica-
tion as spelled out by the foregoing two cases is followed by
other courts, common law copyright will no longer be available
to protect the content of television programs. Television stations,
networks, advertising agencies and the like will rely on the
Copyright Code or invoke the law of unfair competition to pre-
vent the misappropriation of their intellectual efforts.
Whether the courts will employ the law of unfair competition
to supplant common law copyright cannot be determined at this
time. But Judge Learned Hand's comment is as pertinent today
as it was twenty-five years ago:
"There is no part of the law which is more plastic than un-
fair competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable
wrong twenty-five years ago may have become such to-day.',,252
250. Warner, supra note 248 at 210 and 225.
251. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.C.
Mass. 1934), modified, 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670(1936) ; Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490(W.D. Pa. 1938); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 192 P.2d
495 (Cal. App. 1948), aff'd, 208 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1949); Twentieth-Century
Sporting Club v. Trans-Radio Press Service, 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y.Supp.
159 (1937); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl.
631 (1937).
252. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir.
1925).
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